



Fleet Advisory 2025-01 (Accumulated fleet advisories of 2024)

#### Fleet Advisory 2024-02

PSC deficiencies in Tianjin, China on 08 April 2024

Code	Description
04118	The enclosed space list not exhaustive.
	<ul> <li>Ships' enclosed spaces have been identified in a table in the HSE Procedure manual/4.10 Enclosed space entry/para 3.4 with the hazards and safe working practices to be observed when entering these spaces. Though the list in the SMS is exhaustive, it was not the ship specific resulting in this deficiency.</li> <li>Refer IMO Resolution A.1050(27):</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>1 limited openings for entry and exit;</li> <li>2 inadequate ventilation; and</li> <li>3 is not designed for continuous worker occupancy, and includes, but is not limited to, cargo spaces, double bottoms, fuel tanks, ballast tanks, cargo pump-rooms, cargo compressor rooms, cofferdams, chain lockers, void spaces, duct keels, inter-barrier spaces, boilers, engine crankcases, engine scavenge air receivers, sewage tanks, and adjacent connected spaces. This list is not exhaustive and a list should be produced on a ship-by-ship basis to identify enclosed spaces.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Prepare ship specific exhaustive enclosed spaces list and post the laminated copy at or near notice board.</li> <li>The following amendments were made in the Enclosed space entry chapter para 3.5: "A detailed ship specific list of enclosed spaces shall be prepared by the Master and posted on the Notice board. All crew shall be briefed on the list of enclosed spaces onboard".</li> </ul>
05116	Duty Officer not familiar with false alert cancellation procedure for GMDSS equipment.
07122	<ul> <li>Comments:</li> <li>PSCO required the duty officer to demonstrate false alert cancellation of various GMDSS equipment. The officer demonstrated the false alert cancellation of all the GMDSS equipment except the Inmarsat-C equipment which resulted in this deficiency.</li> <li>All officers are required to familiarize themselves with the false alert cancellation procedure. Refer checklist Nav B19 / maker's instructions and flow chart in this regard.</li> <li>Ensure maker's instructions / flowchart for cancelling the false alert are posted in vicinity of each GMDSS equipment.</li> </ul>
07122	Fire control plan stored in the weathertight enclosure outside the deckhouse without prominently standard IMO mark posted.
	<ul> <li>Comments:</li> <li>The IMO symbol for the fire plan was already posted near the weathertight enclosure on the port and stbd side. The PSC inspector insisted that each IMO symbol shall also have an IMO logo printed on the bottom.</li> <li>Company consulted CLASSNK who confirmed that it is not a mandatory requirement to have IMO logo printed at the bottom of the symbol.</li> </ul>

	Ensure both symbols IMO and symbols import of the symbols imp	bol required by MSC/Circular.451 showing fire on aclosure on both side of the accommodation.
	IMO SYMBOL as per fire plan	SYMBOL as required by MSC/Circ. 451
18399	<ul> <li>The refrigeration line in the meat room in</li> <li>Comments:         <ul> <li>The line found frosted by the PSC in evaporator which does not require la defrost during the set defrost cycle.</li> <li>insert lagging on this line.</li> <li>Refer to the maker drawings and encovered with appropriate lagging mapipeline.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	ced seriously. Aspector was the gas return line after the agging as per the maker and will automatically There was no requirement from the maker to sure that the refrigeration room pipelines are aterial (if applicable) to prevent icing of the
	Before without lagging	After installing lagging



#### Date: 20 Apr 2024

## Fleet Advisory 2024-03

PSC deficiency in Vancouver on 15 April 2024

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Code	Description
04118	<b>DEFICIENCY</b> - FORWARD FREEBOARD MARKS NOT PROPERLY PAINTED – MIDSHIP INCORRECTLY SHOWS AB CLASS
	<b>Company comments</b> : The vessel changed CLASS from ABS to NK on 27 March 2023. During the change of CLASS , the ship staff overlooked and only painted the NK markings on top of the existing ABS plimsol line. The ship staff lacked attention in detail and did not weld the CLASSNK markings on the plimsol line upon change of class. During the PSC inspection the NK markings on the plimsol line and forward freeboard marks were found faded which resulted in this deficiency.
	Preventive Actions Ship staff shall ensure that all ship side markings like vessel name , port of registry , IMO number , draft markings , load line markings etc are kept properly painted and legible. (This is the first item any inspector would check prior boarding vessel and the condition of these markings are critical in creating a good impression about the vessel.) At each port of call these markings shall be inspected and painted if deemed necessary. (By obtaining permission from port authorities) Also whenever there is change of classification society , the ship staff shall ensure that permanent markings are welded on the plimsol line. Illegible marks can result in PSC deficiencies or fines in certain ports.



Date: 11 Jun 2024

Fleet Advisory 2024-04

# PSC deficiency - Securing of Engine Room Floor Plate

Code	Description
	<b>DEFICIENCY</b> - Floor Plates in Engine room not secured or properly fastened. As per PSCO requirement, the floor plates in ER should be secured on the frame to avoid shifting in case of ship rolling & pitching at sea / listing / flooding.
	<b>Company comments</b> : It was observed that many vessels were delivered from the shipyard and the floor plates were not secured.
	<ul> <li>Root cause:</li> <li>Inadequate design</li> <li>Lack of situational awareness</li> <li>Inadequate identification of hazards</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Preventive Actions:</li> <li>The Engine room floor plates should be secured on the frame to avoid injury to the crew .</li> <li>The floor plates may shift due to <ul> <li>a) heavy rolling and pitching at sea</li> <li>b) listing of ship during cargo operations in port</li> <li>c) flooding of engine room (water sloshing the bilge area due to rolling creating a hydraulic hammer and forcing the deck plates upwards)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	Floor plates to be secured as per attached guidelines where the details of tools and brass countersunk screws to be used for securing, are provided.
	Floor plates with hinge or the sections of floor plates that need to be removed for valve operation below the floor plate should not be secured permanently by screws.
	The valve number should be stencilled on the top of these plates for easy identification of the valve underneath the plate.
	Requisition for necessary tools and screws to be raised , if not on board . The PO raised shall be informed to the Ship Manager .
	The Chief Engineer to confirm present condition and send pictures of the floor plates to the Ship Manager using picture submission form.
	Target date for compliance: 30th July 2024

As per PSCO requirement, the floor plates in ER should be secured on the frame to avoid shifting in case of ship rolling & pitching at sea / listing / flooding.



At delivery from shipyard, the floor plates are not secured.

# Drill holes in the plates and supporting frames with straight twist drill (Drill $\Phi$ : 9mm)





Drill through the plate and the frame bar.

# Carry out chamfering of the drilled hole on the plate.



Use the M20 straight twist drill to chamfer the hole on the plate.

# Tap the drilled holes on each frame with M10 hand tap.







# Secure the plates with M10 countersunk screws.



Screw IMPA Code: 694201,Name: Machine Screw; Material: Brass; Shape: Countersunk flat. Normal size and thread: M10\*1.5; Length: 20mm.

# Painting the secured bolts with yellow paint.







Area around each bolt to be painted with approx. 8 X 8 cm square for each identification.

Valve No. to be painted on top of check plates for easy identification of valve below the plate.







Date: 29 Jul 2024

# Fleet Advisory 2024-05

## **PSC** deficiencies

Code	Description
10109	<b>DEFICIENCY</b> – RESPONSIBLE OFFICER WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH OPERATION OF NUC LIGHT
	<b>Company comments</b> : During the PSC inspection , the inspector requested the OOW the distance between the two NUC lights as per COLREGS. The OOW replied 1.7 M which was incorrect . As per COLREGS ANNEX I (POSITIONING AND TECHNICAL DETAILS OF LIGHTS AND SHAPES ) ,the vertical distance between the two NUC lights shall not be less than <b>2.0 M</b> apart.
	<ul> <li>Root cause:</li> <li>Incorrect Judgement : When questioned , the OOW made an impulsive response and replied 1.7 M without verifying the exact specifications from the COLREGS publication</li> </ul>
	Inadequate Information handling: The OOW assumed that the vertical distance between NUC lights was 1.7M. He did not refer to the COLREGS publication and provide the correct distance.
	<b>Corrective actions:</b> The OOW referred to the COLREGS publication and informed the PSC inspector that that the requirement of vertical positioning of NUC lights is not less than 2 M. The portable NUC lights on board were verified for 2 M vertical distance. The deficiency was closed by the attending PSC inspector.
	<b>Preventive Actions:</b> All deck officers shall consult the rules and Annexes as per the COLREGS publication. It is not possible to remember all the technical specifications but the OOW shall know where to find them. Also whenever any inspector is requesting for some technical specifications / numerical values from the COLREGS, the OOW shall reply that he shall refer to the COLREGS and
	provide the information. Under no circumstances, the OOW shall make assumptions regarding any technical specification of lights, shapes and sound signals as per COLREGS.
14104	<b>DEFICIENCY</b> – OIL LEVEL SENSOR OF NO.2 CHAMBER FOR O.W.S. NOT WORKING <b>Company comments</b> :
	As per design, the Oil level sensor needs to be immersed in the water/oil for activation. During the PSC inspection, the chamber did not contain sufficient sea water and the oil level sensor was not immersed and hence did not activate resulting in this deficiency.
	<ul> <li>Root cause:</li> <li>Inadequate work/process planning/programming: The ship staff were in a haste and tested the OWS without ensuring that there was sufficient water in the chamber to immerse the oil level sensor</li> </ul>
	<b>Corrective actions:</b> The Ship staff immediately refilled the chamber with sea water and the Oil level sensor was immersed. The OWS was then tested in presence of the PSC inspector and the deficiency was closed.

	<b>Preventive Actions:</b> The Chief engineer has briefed the ship staff to take time and systematically follow the makers procedures and not respond impulsively whenever testing of any equipment /machinery is requested by the PSC inspector .
05110	<b>DEFICIENCY</b> – GUANGZHOU NAVTEX STATION NOT SELECTED AT MANUAL MODE DURING CURRENT VOYAGE FROM SOUTH CHINA SEA TO JINZHOU
	<b>Company comments</b> : While selecting the Navtex station , the second officer decided not to select Guangzhou Station as its coverage area overlapped with Hong Kong station.
	<ul> <li>Root Cause:</li> <li>Incorrect Judgement : The second officer assumed that Guangzhou Station need not be selected as its coverage area overlapped with Hong Kong station.</li> </ul>
	Inadequate monitoring of standard compliance : The Second officer did not select the Guangzhou Station and it was not monitored / crosschecked by the other watch keeping officers
	<b>Corrective actions:</b> The Second officer immediately selected the Guangzhou Station in the Navtex receiver in the presence of the PSC inspector. The deficiency was closed by the attending PSC inspector
	<b>Preventive Actions:</b> The deck officers were briefed that list of all the Navtex stations for the intended voyage shall be identified during the appraisal stage of the passage plan.
	The Second officer shall pay attention in detail and select the Navtex station so as to cover the area in which the vessel is currently sailing and also the one covering the area into which the vessel is about to enter. Each station overlapping with the other station shall also be selected.
	The Navtex stations selected by the Second officer shall be crosschecked by each officer during their watch so as to avoid one man error.
	The Master shall also check randomly if the Navtex stations are programmed in the correct manner.
	The Master has conducted on the job training on use of Navtex receiver to all the deck watch keeping officers.
07109	<b>DEFICIENCY</b> – : Fire safety/maintenance of fire protection system in the CO2 room, some valves(7) of the CO2 bottles have signs of rust.
	<b>Company comments</b> : During the PSC inspection , the inspector observed that 7 valves of the CO2 bottles had signs of oxidisation residue on the brass head component. These bottles which had signs of oxidisation residue were in line with the natural vent of the CO2 room. The mild steel manifold also showed signs of slight spot rust.
	Root Cause:
	Inadequate assessment of preventive maintenance needs: There were no PMS routines for checking the bottle valves for signs of corrosion.
	Inadequate preventative cleaning/resurfacings : The ship staff did not pay attention in detail and inspect the bottle valves thoroughly for corrosion during the monthly inspection routines.

	<b>Corrective actions :</b> The ship staff immediately carried out maintenance of the Co2 valves which had signs oxidisation residue.
	The Chief engineer has rechecked and confirmed that all the remaining CO2 bottles and system were free of residue. The deficiency was closed by the attending PSC inspector.
	<b>Preventive Actions:</b> The Company has amended the Monthly PMS routines to check for corrosion and residue on the Co2 bottle valves and associated equipment. (i.e Check for corrosion / signs of oxidation on each Co2 bottle valve and the manifold and take necessary action as required.) Compliance will be verified by the ship staff during monthly inspections. Compliance will also be verified by the Company staff during internal audits / vessel inspections.
11101	<b>DEFICIENCY</b> – : Lifeboats/ Last lifeboat drill was done March 14, 2024 but boat was not manoeuvred
	<b>Preventive action:</b> The Master shall make attempts to lower and manoeuvre the lifeboat at every opportunity considering the fact that many ports do not permit manoeuvring of the lifeboat and more over the weather conditions may not be favourable.
	As per our SMS , Boats can be lowered and manoeuvred when drifting within 6 miles outside port limits.
	If there is suitable/safe position within 6 miles outside port limits you can consider stopping / drifting for lowering the lifeboat.
	If weather conditions are not favourable an entry shall be made in logbook.
	Also if port authorities deny permission, it shall be recorded in logbook with evidence.
	If unable to lower the lifeboat prior to the due date , the Company shall be informed and dispensation shall be obtained from the flag state.





#### Fleet Advisory 2024-06

PSC deficiencies at Beconcour, Canada on 09 Aug 2024

S.No./ Code	Description
1/ 01220	At the time of inspection, the SEA (contract) for Oiler #1 (Crew List's No.17) was not signed by the seafarer.
	<ul> <li>Comments:         <ul> <li>Check SEA of a crew member is signed by both the seafarer and the office representative when a crew member hands over the SEA to Master before filing the document onboard.</li> <li>Also bring to the notice of the staff that SEA in their possession is signed by both the seafarer and the office representative.</li> <li>Ensure compliance with the 2024-CIC on Crew Wages and Seafarer Employment Agreement (MLC) checklist sent separately. It is the first question in the CIC checklist as following:</li></ul></li></ul>
2/ 03109	At the time of inspection the duct keel (pipe tunnel) watertight hatch was not sealing tight in the E/R.
	<ul> <li><u>Comments:</u></li> <li>Check the gasket of all booby hatches on board for proper sealing. Replace by new gasket where required.</li> <li>Carry out the chalk test if required during routine maintenance.</li> </ul>
3/11101	At the time of inspection the lifeboat engine clutch did not disengage the propeller at the neutral position.
	<ul> <li>Comments:         <ul> <li>During last weekly routine testing of the lifeboat engine and propulsion system prior arrival port, ship staff observed sluggish disengagement of the clutch and so the propeller, but he was able to disengage the clutch in 2-3 attempts. Officer who carried out weekly test failed in his assessment to report it as defect to Chief Engineer for further investigation and reporting to company.</li> <li>Whenever any problem with an equipment is detected or the person is doubtful in his assessment whether problem exists, he should not hesitate to report it as defect to the senior management on board.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	Senior management on board to encourage reporting culture on board the vessel.
4/13102	• Senior management on board to encourage reporting culture on board the vessel. At the time of inspection Auxiliary Engines Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were displaying multiple alarms regarding exhaust gas temperatures, e.g. mean temperature excessive deviation, turbocharger temperature, etc.





	- Maintain detailed records of inspections and maintenance activities.
5/15150	Deficiency(s) marked ISM is (are) objective evidence of a failure, or lack of effectiveness, of the implementation of the ISM Code. The ship will be eligible for re-inspection after 3 months from the final date of the report.
	<ul> <li>Comments: <ul> <li>Lack of verification, Inadequate maintenance, Inadequate assessment of the problem and lack of awareness with the MLC requirement resulted in the deficiencies on board the vessel.</li> <li>Staff is required to carry out maintenance diligently as per PMS, seek advice from senior management in case of doubt about any problem with any equipment.</li> <li>Report any defect, no matter how minor it may seem, to senior management on board.</li> </ul></li></ul>
6/18316	At the time of inspection there was no hot water in the accommodations; minimum temperature of 60 degrees Celsius must be maintained to prevent bacterial growth, e.g. Legionella.
	Comments: Regulation ===
	<ul> <li>MLC 2006 / Regulation 3.1 – Accommodation and recreational facilities / 11. With respect to requirements for sanitary facilities:</li> <li>(d) with the exception of passenger ships, each sleeping room shall be provided with a washbasin having hot and cold running fresh water, except where such a washbasin is situated in the private bathroom provided;</li> <li>(f) hot and cold running fresh water shall be available in all wash places.</li> <li>Guideline B3.1.9 – Other facilities / 1</li> <li>(b) fitted with individual clothes lockers as well as with tubs or showers or both and washbasins having hot and cold running fresh water.</li> </ul>
	Refer above regulation, if hot water is not available in the wash basins, bathroom showers and other wash places, it should be immediately brought to the attention of Master so that remedial action can be taken. The availability of hot water in the accommodation common areas such as hospitals, galley, tally room etc should be checked on weekly basis during routine accommodation inspection.
	Calorifier without efficient circulation and with dead ends provide optimum condition for bacterial growth in temperature range from 15 deg. C to 50 deg. C. The water temperature in the Calorifier should be set to at least 60 deg. C to minimize their growth.





# Fleet Advisory 2024-07

PSC deficiencies at Ortona, Italy on 30 Aug 2024

1/     E/R washbasin damaged & inoperative.	
18302 Comments:	
<ul> <li>The washbasin support base was rusted/wast</li> <li>Ensure that all washbasins on board are in go washbasin in the neglected areas E/R, change</li> <li>The washbasins of the common areas are to b accommodation. Check taps, water colour, pip</li> </ul>	ed and non-operational. od operational condition, check e rooms, tally room and common toilets. be inspected during weekly inspection of bing, drainage and cleanliness.
2/ During test Emergency Fire Pump was inoperative	e. Crew solved the problem before the
04102 ending of the inspection.	
<ul> <li>Comments:</li> <li>The water from the water priming tank to the c the pipe. Water tank was cleaned and pipe wa</li> <li>The water priming tank and flow of water from inspection of the self-priming pump, same is b in the PMS.</li> </ul>	asing was not flowing due to clogging of is unclogged. it is to be checked during routine weekly eing added in the weekly job description
3/04110 Crew member with assigned emergency duties are	e not fully familiar with their duties.
<ul> <li>Comments:         <ul> <li>Crew took longer time than usual to lower, to r lifeboat in water and releasing the painter from aware with the painter release device but was the frozen shackle.</li> <li>Observe the crew performance during abando and carry out the training in the lacking areas.</li> <li>Ensure all crew are aware of following:</li> <li>Abandon ship signal</li> <li>Crew suitably dressed and lifejackets are correction inquiring the duty of each crew member</li> <li>Preparing the lifeboat for lowering – rigging for removing F&amp;A gripes</li> <li>Lowering the lifeboat – using manual handle at Rigging the embarkation ladder</li> <li>Disembarkation using ladder</li> <li>Releasing lifeboat falls</li> <li>Releasing lifeboat form water</li> <li>Checking release device is correctly set</li> <li>Check the lifeboat away from vessel during reduction the deck logbook. (There is going to be large of stowage position due to the magnetic field of the deck logbook.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	rig the embarkation ladder, to board the h lifeboat. Assigned person was not trying to release the painter by opening on ship drill when lowering the lifeboat ectly donned rward painter, removing the safety pin, and pulling the wire from inside pass heading, compared to ships gyro butine launching in water and record in difference if compasses compared in he ship's structure)
position that cannot be reached in safely because	e steps are missing.





#### Comments:

• If the air vents around accommodation are not reachable safely from the deck level, please inform your Ship Manager/Superintendent for installing the step below the air vent.







8/14	The ship's hull where the antifouling paint was applied has several rust spots.
	<b>Comments:</b> Inspect the ship's hull when vessel alongside in port and plan to carry out the maintenance and painting the ship side as required. Master to obtain the permission from Port Authorities via agent prior arrival and carry out ship side painting/maintenance in port/anchorage if permitted. If permission for painting is not granted, please make an entry in the deck logbook.

## **Fleet Advisory**

PSC deficiencies at Porto Marghera, Italy on 17 Oct 2024

S.No./ Code	Description
1/	One port side, a padlock has been found used to close a gate for security purposes
16101	along with a means of escape.
	Commonte
	The plastic security seal is to be preferred for locking the accommodation external
	ladders in place of a padlock in ports where there is a negligible security risk of theft,
	stowaways, contraband etc.
	The accommodation external ladders are to be padlocked in ports where there is a
	risk areas.
	<ul> <li>In port: If external ladder is locked using a padlock, the key is to be kept at the</li> </ul>
	gangway security desk and another key is to be kept in ship's office.
	• At sea: During high-risk transit area when external ladder is locked using padlock, the
	<ul> <li>All crew is to be made aware of the locations of the keys keeping in mind that safety of</li> </ul>
	the crew overrides the security. Keys are to be properly marked for the location.
2/	Plastic seal in use Plastic seal in use
2/	On forward mooring station, grid for safe passage found with minor corrosion, in
18425	addition, a cable gland on starboard side found with point of rust.
	Comments:
	The forward mooring winch gratings and cable gland pipe along the foremast was
	having spot rust.





• When carrying out cosmetic maintenance as per maintenance plan, all fittings within the area to be attended, without missing out or ignoring any sections.

#### **Fleet Advisory**

PSC deficiencies at Zhenjiang, China on 18 Oct 2024

S.No.	Description
/	
Code	
1/	Decks bulkheads and penetrations -
0710	Insulation materials for pipes from E/R to fire station on A-60 deck not extended 450mm.
1	
	Comments:
	• The insulation was not installed on the two compressed air pipes passing through the A
	Class floor to the fire station.
	• All other pipes, ducts and penetrations passing through the A-Class protection deck are
	to be insulated up to 450 mm.
	<ul> <li>Check pipes penetrating the A-Class division are insulated until length of 450mm.</li> </ul>
	Before - without insulation After - with insulation
	Following ClassNK Guidance Part R Annex R9.3.1 Fig.2.1.3-1 for quick reference in accordance with SOLAS II-2 / Reg.9.3.





#### 2.1.3 Prevention of Heat Transmission

1 Where a pipe penetrates in a deck or a bulkhead which is required to be insulated, the insulation is to be carried past the penetration for a distance at least 450 mm. (See Fig. 2.1.3-1)

2 Notwithstanding <u>1</u> above, for a penetration of a pipe made of material having low-heat conductivity character (e.g. a metalic pipe) and an outside diameter of less than 150 mm in a "B" class division, the insulation may be terminated at the end of penetration piece or sleeve as required. (See Fig. 2.1.3-2)









#### Date: 02 DEC 2024

## Fleet Advisory 2024-08

Port: Nelson, New Zealand

## **PSC deficiencies**

Code	Description
01220	Deficiency - Seafarers onboard not provided with original SEA
01220	<b>Company comments:</b> During the PSC inspection , the inspector requested the original contracts from 2 crew. The crew replied that they had the copy of the contract, and the original contract was with the Master.
	The PSC inspector informed that the crew should be in possession of the original contract as per MLC regulation and issued this deficiency.
	<b>Regulatory requirement: MLC A 2.1</b> - SEAFARERS EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT "The shipowner and seafarer concerned shall each have a signed original of the seafarer's employment agreement"
	<b>Root Cause : Lack of Knowledge</b> The ship staff were unaware that they shall be in possession of the original contract and had submitted the original contract to the Master upon joining vessel
	<b>Preventive Actions</b> The crewing department personnel were briefed regarding this deficiency. The crewing manager shall ensure that 3 original contracts are issued for any seafarer joining vessel.
	One for the Master, one for the crew and one for the Company.
	Each seafarer shall ensure they have the original contract in their custody at all times.
07113	Deficiency - Bridge wing stbd side fire hose punctured and leaking
	<b>Root Cause</b> : Lack of situational awareness / risk perception / risk awareness Upon investigation, it was observed that the hose box was mounted with a bolt protruding inside the hose box. The hose was tightly stowed in direct contact with the bolt (which was rusted and sharp) and due to ships vibration the bolt had punctured the hose. Refer below photo.
	<b>Preventive Actions</b> Check for protruding objects in the hose box and take necessary actions like renewing the corroded bolts , cutting excess length and applying Denso tape so that the hose is stowed in a safe manner.

Compliance shall be verified by the safety officer onboard.

	Deficiency - Stern light lower light defective
10109	
	Root Cause: Failure to Follow Procedure/instructions
	The Company's prearrival checklist requires that all the navigation lights are tested prior arrival port which was not complied with in true spirit. The OOW tested only the upper stern light and did not test the lower stern light.
	Preventive Actions
	The ship staff shall ensure that all lights are in good order and tested as per Company SMS requirements ( i.e All navigation lights (both main and emergency) shall be tested half an hour before sunset every day and also prior arrival and departure each port). Any light found non-functional should be immediately reported & replaced. The Company will take appropriate disciplinary action if the checklists are not complied with
	in true spirit by any officer.